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INTRODUCTION
ASCU fails to meet its "heavy burden" of overcoming this Court's "strong
presumption against waiver" of arbitration. ASCU admits that such waiver must be the
"intentional relinquishment of a known right" and does not dispute that Wolf Mountain
had affirmed for years its belief that it could not exercise such right under the parties'
SPA Agreement. ASCU also does not dispute that Summit County held the same
position, and still does. By contrast, even now, ASCU does not state whether not it
believes that Wolf Mountain can seek arbitration under the SPA Agreement. ASCU
really has no response to the law or undisputed facts on this issue.
Instead, ASCU turns only to Chandler for "implicit" indicia of intent. However,
there is no need for implicit indicia when intent is stated explicitly, as in this case. In
addition, ASCU does not dispute that the trial court's ruling was the first external
indication that Wolf Mountain could seek arbitration under the SPA Agreement, or that
Wolf Mountain promptly sought arbitration thereafter. Plainly, the trial court's ruling
effectively prevented Wolf Mountain from accessing the courts (and thus was not merely
dictum). Further, ASCU expressly agreed in the SPA Agreement that its provisions,
which include the arbitration agreement, could not be waived. In sum, Wolf Mountain
plainly did not "intentionally relinquish a known right" to arbitration.
Even under Chandler, ASCU does not dispute that, prior to Wolf Mountain
seeking arbitration, the parties participated almost entirely in fact discovery and related
pretrial motions. Such alone does not constitute waiver under this Court's decisions. In
addition, by ASCU's own admission, the same discovery in this case relates to both
1

arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims, and thus would have to have been conducted
anyway - resulting in "no prejudice" to ASCU under Chandler itself.
Next, ASCU totally ignores the constitutional challenge to Chandler and its
progeny. ASCU does not even address the quoted sections of the Utah Constitution, let
alone this Court's decisions or Wolf Mountain's arguments on that subject. Instead, it
selectively quotes Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3 to make it appear that courts can add any
equitable exceptions to the Utah Arbitration Act that they desire. This is plainly false. In
addition, ASCU relies generally on stare decisis, although it shows no decisions in which
this Court actually considered the Utah Constitution regarding arbitration at all.
Furthermore, ASCU identifies arbitration as a contractual right, but fails to follow
the statute's two-step approach: (1) determine whether an arbitration agreement exists
(that should not be revoked), and then (2) if so, order arbitration. In addition, ASCU cites
many cases that hold that arbitration may be waived, but no cases that considered
whether the statutory language used in the Act is mandatory and jurisdictional under
constitutional analysis. Some of ASCU's cited cases are misstated, and few even
consider jurisdiction at all; none discuss constitutional mandates. Many state and federal
courts, by contrast, have determined that statutes such as Utah's Act divest the trial court
of jurisdiction. Regardless, only this Court can determine whether under Utah's
Constitution and arbitration statute, arbitration is mandatory and may not be waived.
Finally, despite ASCU's contentions, expediency is not the governing policy at
bar: it is ensuring enforcement of arbitration agreements, which are highly favored.
ASCU bears a heavy burden to prove otherwise. It has not done so.
2

REPLY TO ASCU'S ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue #1: ASCU contends that Wolf Mountain "misstates the governing standard
of review," although both parties cite the same basic rule out of Central Florida
Investments v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, ^ 20, 40 P.3d 599. (See ASCU Br. at 1;
WM Br. at 3-4). Contrary to ASCU's position, the qualifying corollary of McCoy v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 1999 UT App 199, f 10, 980 P.2d 694 applies because, as
here, the Court of Appeals was reviewing the denial of a motion to compel arbitration
where the trial court reviewed only "documentary evidence without conducting an
evidentiary hearing on disputed facts." McCoy, 1999 UT App 199, ^f 10. In fact, the trial
court in this case did not even hear oral argument regarding the motion at issue. For
additional treatment of this subject, see Section I.E., infra.
Issue #2: ASCU does not dispute the legal standard of review set forth in Wolf
Mountain's Brief regarding the second major issue in this appeal.
REPLY TO ASCU'S "STATEMENT OF FACT"
ASCU's "Statement of Fact" contains several unsupported and/or irrelevant
statements apparently aimed at attacking Wolf Mountain's credibility, not the issues on
appeal. (See, e.g., ASCU Br. at 9 "Although Wolf knew of this alleged default for
several years, it deliberately waited to assert it until Wolf thought it was to its strategic
advantage . . . ."). Such violate URAP 24(k)'s directive that all briefs be "free from
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters." UTAH R. APP. P. 24(k).
Relevance, propriety, and page limitations prevent Wolf Mountain from detailing the
falsehood of many of these "facts" and listing ASCU's numerous "bad acts" in kind.
3

ARGUMENT
L

ASCU FAILS TO MEET ITS "HEAVY BURDEN" OF PROVING THAT
WOLF MOUNTAIN WAIVED ARBITRATION.
A.

ASCU Does Not Dispute its "Heavy Burden" in Proving Waiver.

ASCU does not dispute (1) "the important public policy behind enforcing
arbitration agreements," (2) that "there is a strong presumption against waiver of
the right to arbitrate," or (3) that the party claiming waiver of the right to
arbitration bears a "heavy burden" to prove that such has occurred. Cedar Surgery
Ctr. v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58, \ 14, 96 P.3d 911 (citations omitted); Cent Fla. Invs.,
2002 UT 3, f 24 (citations omitted). ASCU fails to carry this "heavy burden."
B.

ASCU Does Not Show that Wolf Mountain "Intentionally
Relinquished a Known Right" to Arbitration.
1.

ASCU Does Not Dispute Wolf Mountain's Explicit
Intent Prior to the Trial Court's Ruling.

ASCU concedes that "waiver" is the "intentional relinquishment of a
known right," that this Court has "held that a 'waiver of the right to arbitrate must
be intentional,' and a court may infer waiver 'only if the facts demonstrate that the
party seeking to enforce arbitration intended to disregard its right to arbitrate/"1
ASCU responds that the two-pronged Chandler test describes how intent
may be inferred. (ASCU Br. at 38 (citing Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 359 n.17 (Utah 1992)). However, ASCU misses the point:
because Wolf Mountain's intent was explicit, the Court need not examine the

1

See ASCU Br. at 38 (quoting Soter 'st Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 857 P.2d
935, 939-40 (Utah 1993) and Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at \ 14 (emphasis added)).
4

implicit indicia of intent under Chandler. (WM Br. at 24-28). ASCU does not
dispute that Wolf Mountain explicitly stated its intent from the outset of this case,
including on the record before the trial court: that it did not believe that it had the
right to seek arbitration of these claims. (R. 3164 (66:11-69:4); WM Br. at 25).
Notably, ASCU does not show, or even claim, that it ever disagreed with
Wolf Mountain's belief in this regard. In fact, ASCU does not even state in its
Brief whether it now believes that the SPA Agreement provides Wolf Mountain
with the right to seek arbitration. ASCU itself is ambivalent on this issue.
2.

ASCU Does Not Prove "Intentional Relinquishment" of
Arbitration Under the SPA Agreement

Instead, ASCU asserts that because Wolf Mountain knew the SPA
Agreement's terms, Wolf Mountain cannot argue that it did not intend to waive
arbitration under the Agreement by not seeking arbitration earlier. (ASCU Br. at
35-36). It is true that Wolf Mountain knew, and was responsible for knowing, the
SPA Agreement's terms. However, ASCU again mistakes the meaning of
"waiver." Under the waiver doctrine, the issue is "intentional relinquishment of a
known right." Soter's, 857 P.2d at 938. In this case, Wolf Mountain believed, in
good faith, that it had no right to seek arbitration and explicitly so stated. It could
not "intentionally relinquish" something that it did not believe it had, and in fact
explicitly asserted was not a right it possessed. In fact, Utah law states the
opposite: that relinquishment sufficient for waiver "must be distinctly made,"
"intentional and distinct," and "clearly intended." Soter's, 857 P.2d at 938; IHC
Health Servs. v. D & KMgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, % 19, 196 P.3d 588, 594.
5

Notably, ASCU does not dispute that Summit County, the foremost party to
the SPA Agreement, also explicitly stated that it was the only party to the SPA
Agreement that had the right to seek arbitration under that Agreement. (WM Br.
at 25). ASCU does not even respond to Wolf Mountain's evidence that even
months after the trial court determined that Wolf Mountain was required to
demand arbitration from the Third Parties, Summit County again came to the same
conclusion in its "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding the
Enforcement and Status o f the SPA Agreement. (R. 4541 at Exh. A at 7, 37).
Ultimately, ASCU does not identify any person - even itself- that believed
that anyone other than Summit County could invoke arbitration under the SPA
Agreement prior to the trial court's ruling on this issue. Accordingly, ASCU fails
to meet its "heavy burden."
3.

ASCU Does Not Dispute that the Trial Court's April 29,
2009 Ruling Rejected Wolf Mountain's Position
Regarding Arbitration Under the SPA Agreement.

ASCU argues that the trial court dismissed Wolf Mountain's Motion to
Amend on grounds other than arbitration, and that the trial court's statement on
arbitration under the SPA Agreement was dictum. (ASCU Br. at 5-6; R. 3082).
However, ASCU does not dispute that the trial court's April 29, 2009 ruling
rejected Wolf Mountain's position that it was unable to seek arbitration under the
SPA Agreement. (R. 3065-87). There, the trial court determined that "the SPA
Agreement does require arbitration." (R. 3082.) The trial court added: "Thus,
any claim by Wolf that the SPA Agreement was violated in some way is subject to
6

the mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement." Id. As a result, Wolf
Mountain was effectively prohibited from seeking relief against the Third Parties
in court. Instead, it was directed to seek relief in arbitration. See id. The trial
court's statement was not dictum because it foreclosed Wolf Mountain's access to
the courts on its claims against the Third Parties, which were similar to its claims
against ASCU. Wolf Mountain tried to get all affected parties in the same forum.
More importantly, by that ruling, Wolf Mountain was informed, for the first
time, that it could (and must) seek relief for claims under the SPA Agreement only
by arbitration. This was a sea change in Wolf Mountain's understanding and
application of the SPA Agreement for the three prior years in the case - which
Summit County has confirmed, and ASCU even now does not dispute.
Notably, other jurisdictions have held that, "especially in cases in which
any delay in making a motion to compel arbitration is based on unfavorable or
uncertain law, waiver should not be found." Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d
1328, 1332 (8th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added) (citing Nesslage, 823 F.2d 231, 234;
Fogarty v. Piper, 781 F.2d 662, 663 (8th Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, 795
F.2d 1393, 1394 (8th Cir. 1986)). This is so even when a party has participated in
one and one-half, two, or even five years of discovery prior to seeking arbitration.
See id. That position comports with this Court's "strong presumption against
waiver of the right to arbitrate." Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58, \ 14.
4.

ASCU Explicitly Agreed that No Party to The SPA
Agreement Could Waive its Provisions.

Finally, in the SPA Agreement, ASCU also explicitly agreed:
7

Section 6.14 No Waiver. Failure of a party hereto to exercise any right
hereunder shall not be deemed a waiver of any such right and shall not
affect the right of such party to exercise at some future time said right or
any other right it may have hereunder.
(WM Br. at Add. 1 at § 6.14 (emphasis added)). There is no dispute that Wolf Mountain
is a party to the SPA Agreement, that ASCU agreed to this provision, or that arbitration
is a "right under" the SPA Agreement. (Id. at 1, § 5.8.1).
In construing contractual provisions, this Court must "determine what the parties
have agreed upon by looking first to the plain language within the four corners of the
document." Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2009 UT 54, \ 13, 217 P.3d
716 (citation omitted). In addition, "[w]hen interpreting the plain language, 'we look for
a reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any provision
meaningless.'" Id. (citation omitted).
If the foregoing "non-waiver" agreement in the SPA Agreement is to have any
meaning at all, it must memorialize all of the parties' agreement - including ASCU's that the parties could not waive arbitration simply by "failing to exercise that right" until
a "future time." (WM Br. at Exh. Add. 1 at § 6.14). ASCU plainly so agreed.2

Beyond legal arguments, ASCU resorts to adhominem attacks against Wolf Mountain,
claiming that Wolf Mountain's explicitly-stated belief regarding arbitration - which
ASCU does not contradict, even now - is "yet another groundless effort to excuse" itself,
and that, by filing its motion to compel arbitration after the trial court's first ruling,
"Wolfs motives appear clear." (ASCU Br. at 34-36). Unfortunately, these are only a
couple of ASCU's unsupported and irrelevant adhominem attacks. See, e.g., ASCU Br.
at 9 ("Although Wolf knew of this alleged default for several years, it deliberately waited
to assert it until Wolf thought it was to its strategic advantage to attempt to gain
concessions from ASCU in the golf course transaction."). ASCU presents no actual
evidence of malicious motive or even bad faith by Wolf Mountain; its unsupported
aspersions should not be tolerated. See,e.g., Camfieldv. Okla. City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1224
8

C.

ASCU Does Not Dispute That the Parties Participated Primarily
in Fact Discovery and Pretrial Motions Prior to the Motion to
Compel Arbitration.

Regarding Chandler's two-part waiver test, ASCU does not dispute that: "The
primary purpose of [its] first prong . . . is to allow a court to evaluate whether the party
asserting the right to arbitrate has clearly manifested an intent to waive its right to
arbitration." Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at ^ 16 (emphasis added). As set forth
above, Wolf Mountain did not "clearly manifest" an intent to waive arbitration. Id. To
the opposite, it explicitly stated its position that it did not have such a right.
In its Brief, ASCU correctly points out that before Wolf Mountain filed its Motion
to Compel Arbitration, the parties engaged in extensive fact discovery, including
depositions, subpoenas, document requests, motions to compel, case management orders,
etc. (ASCU Br. at 28-29). Wolf Mountain already acknowledged this fact. (WM Br. at
16-17, 20). However, ASCU concedes that, aside from an early motion to dismiss and its
own two early motions for partial summary judgment, such fact discovery, discovery
scheduling, and related discovery motions are all that occurred prior to Wolf Mountain
filing its Motion to Compel Arbitration. (ASCU Br. at 26-29).
ASCU distinguishes the facts in Central Florida Investments, which truly do differ
from the facts herein. However, this Court's holding therein is still applicable here:
If we were to hold that [a party's] participation in the litigation
process, particularly discovery, regardless of its intent regarding
arbitration or the extent of its participation in litigation, the result
would be that in subsequent cases parties would arguably always waive
(10th Cir. 2001) (chastening counsel for ad hominem attacks against opposing party as
"wholly inappropriate and completely unfounded").
9

arbitration in complying with deadlines imposed by the rules
governing litigation in the courts.
Furthermore, we must factor in the strong policy of the law in Utah in favor
of arbitration, the strong presumption against waiver of the right to
arbitrate, and the burden of establishing substantial participation on the
party claiming waiver. If participation in discovery and pretrial
motions, standing alone, irrespective of the parties' intentions, were to
constitute waiver of the right to arbitrate, the strong policy favoring
arbitration would be damaged.
Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 atffif32-33 (emphases added).
Finally, ASCU does not dispute that, prior to filing the Motion, no party
had filed expert reports, conducted expert discovery, served motions for summary
judgment, or completed other pretrial tasks. (See Docket.) ASCU also does not
dispute that even fact discovery has not been completed in this case. In fact, Wolf
Mountain has been forced to file, to date, eleven (11) motions to compel ASCU,
its affiliates, employees, auditors, attorneys, and other related parties to comply
with valid discovery requests. (See, e.g., R. 3956-61, 3962-66, 4045-4050,).
D.

Wolf Mountain's Participation in Litigation Did Not Result in
Prejudice to ASCU.

Regarding Chandler's second prong, ASCU contends that it has been
prejudiced by participating in litigation due to the "broad ranging [sic] discovery"
in this case. (ASCU Br. at 31). It is true that the parties have participated in many
depositions, written discovery, discovery motions, etc. (see above section).
However, this Court plainly held in Chandler itself- and ASCU does not
dispute - that "no prejudice results if the discovery relates to nonarbitrable
claims which will be severed and separately litigated." Chandler, 833 P.2d at
10

359 n.17 (citations omitted). ASCU also does not dispute that the claims in this
Appeal have been stayed, while the parties are separately litigating the Remaining
Claims. (ASCU Br. at 33; Order dated July 30, 2009 in this Appeal).
Instead, ASCU argues that "the discovery conducted to date . . . has not
been, and is not able to be, severed and separated between those claims" in this
Appeal and the Remaining Claims. (ASCU Br. at 33). However, ASCU
simultaneously misreads this Court's decision and inadvertently proves Wolf
Mountain's point. This Court held in Chandler that it is the claims, not the
discovery, that are severed in eliminating prejudice. See Chandler, 833 P.2d at
359 n.17. There is no dispute that the SPA Agreement Claims in this Appeal have
been stayed, while the Remaining Clams are currently proceeding to trial - and
thus are "severed and separately litigated." Id. By its argument, ASCU admits
that the discovery cannot be severed between the claims - i.e., that the discovery
applies to both (1) the arbitrable SPA Agreement Claims in this Appeal and (2) the
Remaining Claims that are currently proceeding to trial in litigation. The
Remaining Claims, according to ASCU's own statements, will be separately tried
on the same damage evidence. (WM Br. at 31-33). Thus, ASCU actually proves
the Chandler rule by showing how it has not been prejudiced by that discovery.
Next, ASCU asserts that it has been prejudiced in this litigation because the
discovery in this case gave Wolf Mountain "information for arbitration that it
would not otherwise have." (ASCU Br. at 31). However, ASCU does not identify
any such information in this category, and thus this argument should be rejected.
11

Further, ASCU asserts that it is prejudiced by this litigation because it
includes counterclaims against third parties not subject to arbitration. (ASCU Br.
at 31). This argument again undermines ASCU's own position: because those
parties could not have been part of the arbitration, the claims against them would
have to be filed in litigation regardless of the arbitration proceeding, thus further
necessitating the discovery and other actions that have taken place in this case.
Finally, ASCU claims that Wolf Mountain is simply attempting to "forum
shop" after "testing the judicial waters." (ASCU Br. at 32). However, ASCU
does not point to any event triggering the need to "navigate elsewhere." By
contrast, Wolf Mountain has identified the precise and indelible event triggering
its motion to compel arbitration: the first time the trial court (or anyone else)
declared that arbitration was available to these parties, let alone the proper remedy.
Thus, ASCU incurs no prejudice by the discovery conducted herein
because, by its own argument, it would have had to conduct the same discovery
even without the SPA Agreement Claims subject to arbitration in this Appeal.3
Notably, ASCU does not even respond to the decisions cited by this Court in

After this Court issued its July 30, 2009 Order staying the litigation of the SPA
Agreement Claims pending this Appeal, ASCU newly argued in the trial court that the
Remaining Claims also invoke the same development damages as the SPA Agreement
Claims. Such contention appears to be a contrived "end run" around this Court's Stay
Order. However, if true, ASCU's quest for development damages in the Specially
Planned Area regarding the Remaining Claims also falls under the rubric of the SPA
Agreement, which exclusively governs such development and which requires arbitration.
Accordingly, Wolf Mountain has since filed a motion to compel arbitration of these
claims, which the trial court also denied. Wolf Mountain then filed an appeal of that
denial, along with a Motion to Stay those claims pending this Court's decision.
12

Chandler, in which pretrial fact discovery was deemed insufficient to prejudice
opposing parties to the point of requiring a waiver of arbitration - even when
discovery did not relate to nonarbitrable claims.4
E.

ASCU's "Marshaling" Argument Should be Rejected.

In its Brief, ASCU repeats the worn refrain of most appellees: that the appellant
"failed to marshal the evidence." (ASCU Br. at 23-24). However, "the marshaling
requirement applies only to challenges of factual findings, not to conclusions of law."
Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, \ 37, 94 P.3d 193 (citation omitted). Wolf
Mountain's challenges in this Appeal are legal, including: whether the trial court applied
the proper standard for waiver, whether it correctly determined that there was an
"intentional relinquishment of a known right," its legal conclusions on the undisputed
facts, and the constitutionality of arbitration waiver under the applicable statute. As in
Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993), Wolf Mountain is "not
attacking the sufficiency of the evidence; rather, [it] is arguing that the trial court did not
comply with the requirements of the applicable rules as a matter of law." Id. at 993 n.3.
"Therefore, [Wolf Mountain was] not required to marshal the evidence . . . ." Id.
In addition, ASCU admits that in rendering its decision, the trial court conducted
no evidentiary hearing and did not even hear oral argument - it only reviewed the
undisputed fact record. (R. 4007; ASCU Br. at 2 ("The trial court did not need to conduct
an evidentiary hearing . . . the record on its face provides ample evidence") (emphasis
added). When there are no fact disputes, the trial court's review is akin to a ruling on

4

See WM Br. at 33 (citing Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 n.17 {see citations therein).
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summary judgment, which requires no marshaling. See, e.g., Smith v. Four Corners
Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, t 16 n.6, 70 P.3d 904 ("When appealing a district
court's grant of summary judgment, however, the appellant has no obligation to marshal
the evidence. . . . At the summary judgment stage, the district court is not concerned
about the sufficiency of the evidence because it does not resolve any factual disputes.").
This Court is equally capable of reviewing the record as the trial court, and thus
need not give deference to the trial court's ruling on a purely record review. See McCoy,
1999 UT App 199, ^j 10 (according no deference on the trial court's determination of the
existence of an arbitration agreement because the trial court considered "documentary
evidence without conducting an evidentiary hearing on disputed facts").
Furthermore, Wolf Mountain does not dispute any of the underlying facts
regarding the trial court's decision in this case, including the parties' various discovery
requests, depositions, and other actions taken in this case. Those matters are all plainly
stated on the docket. As in Utah Auto Auction, 2008 UT App 293, 191 P.3d 1252, "the
facts are, for the most part, undisputed," and Wolf Mountain "is not challenging the
evidence underlying the court's decision, but the legal conclusions drawn therefrom." Id.
at U 9 n.4. Thus, as in Utah Auto Auction, Wolf Mountain "need not marshal." Id.
Finally, ASCU fails to identify any of the facts that Wolf Mountain allegedly did
not "marshal" in its Brief. ASCU's marshalling argument should be rejected.
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II.

ASCU MISSTATES § 78-31a-3, REFUSES TO ADDRESS
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS, IGNORES THE TWO-STEP
PROCESS OF § 78-31a-4, AND FAILS TO CITE CASES THAT
ADDRESS THE MANDATORY NATURE OF THAT STATUTE.
A.

ASCU Misstates the Law of Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3.

ASCU contends that the Utah Arbitration Act (the "Act") "expressly preserves the
ability of a court to employ its powers of equity" because Section 78-3 la-3 provides that
a "court may find an arbitration agreement is not enforceable upon any 'grounds existing
at law or equity/" (ASCU Br. at 42 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-3 (1999))
(enclosed in the Addendum hereto) (emphasis by ASCU)).
It is unclear whether, by this selective quotation, ASCU truly intends to deceive
this Court or simply fails to read the rest of the statute. Regardless, when read in full,
Section 78-3 la-3 actually provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity
to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-3 la-3 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to ASCU's statement,

the Legislature did not empower Utah courts to "find an arbitration agreement
unenforceable" for any possible grounds that it could identify. Instead, it empowered
Utah courts to "set aside the agreement" when proper, "or when fraud is alleged." Id.
The term "set aside" is synonymous with the terms "vacate," "annul, abolish,
revoke, abrogate, repeal, make void, do away with." Util Trailer Sales of Salt Lake, Inc.
v. Fake, 740 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Utah 1987); Cleggv. Schvaneveldt, 8 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah
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1932). Likewise, under the current Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, which ASCU also
cites, the provision substituted for Section 78-3 la-3 (1999) states as follows:
An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or
subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity
for the revocation of a contract.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78B-11-107(1) (2010) (emphasis added). The clear import of these

provisions is that if the agreement was not properly entered into from the outset, it should
be completely "set aside" or "revoked," including when fraud was involved.
Plainly, ASCU has not asserted that the SPA Agreement or its arbitration clause
should be revoked, or that fraud is at issue. However, under the current and former
versions of the Act, grounds in law or equity may only be utilized to "set aside" or
"revoke" the SPA Agreement. Accordingly, contrary to ASCU's argument, the Act does
not "expressly preserve[] the ability of a court" to find waiver. (ASCU Br. at 42).
ASCU cites other Utah cases that discuss the doctrines of part performance and
unconscionability in reference to Section 78-3 la-3. (ASCU Br. at 42-43). However,
ASCU fails to show that in those cases, or any others, this Court addressed the mandatory
nature of that statute, or even that the parties made such an argument to the Court. (See
id.). This Court was not required to address legal arguments that were not briefed.5

5

See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, \ 95, 20 P.3d 342 ("[W]e do not abrogate a
defendant's obligation or assume the role of an advocate by researching all applicable
law and searching the entire record for each and every indication of possible or potential
error."); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Utah 1993) ("We cannot resolve this
issue because it is not before us."); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 799
P.2d 1156, 1163 (Utah 1990) ("Clearly, we cannot resolve the issue here, because . . . we
have had no briefing on the issue.").
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B.

The Legislature is Not Required to List Every Action that Utah Courts
May Not Take.

Strangely, ASCU contends that because the Legislature did not specifically
identify "waiver" as an improper ground for not enforcing an arbitration agreement, Utah
courts have carte blanche to find waiver or any other ground for avoiding the statute's
mandate. (ASCU Br. at 41-42). However, the Legislature is not required to list every
single thing that Utah courts cannot do. In fact, the Utah Constitution and this Court state
just the opposite: that the Legislature retains all powers not given to Utah's courts or
others. (WM Br. at 34-37). ASCU fails to even respond to this crucial law.
C.

ASCU Fails to Dispute that the Utah Constitution Mandates
Arbitration of Valid Arbitration Agreements.

In fact, ASCU fails to address or even truly dispute any of the provisions of the
Utah Constitution cited in Wolf Mountain's Brief regarding the mandatory nature of
Section 78-3 la-3. In addition, ASCU ignores this Court's own opinions in that regard.
Instead, ASCU calls Wolf Mountain's arguments a "meritless theory" and relies merely
on the doctrine of stare decisis. (ASCU Br. at 41). Accordingly, the constitutional law
set forth in Wolf Mountain's Brief is unrebutted, and this Court should hold that Section
78-3 la-4 is mandatory and jurisdictional.
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D.

Stare Decisis Is Not Determinative Because This is an Issue of First
Impression.

In addition, ASCU's stare decisis argument fails. While Chandler and its six
progeny applied the doctrine of waiver to contractual arbitration agreements, none of
those cases construe or even discuss the mandatory statutory language of Section 78-3 la4. Specifically, Chandler limited its discussion of the Act to a passing reference to
section 78-3 la-19(l). See Chandler, 833 P.2d at 358. Similarly, only three of the cases
that follow Chandler even mention the Act, and even those cases do not construe section
78-3 la-4 of the Act. Accordingly, this issue is a matter of first impression.
E.

ASCU Improperly Seeks to Truncate the Act's Two-Step Approach.

The vast majority of ASCU's argument is that arbitration is a contractual right that
can be waived like any other such right. (ASCU Br. at 41-48). ASCU's argument is
half-true; however, its conclusion is incorrect because it omits the second half of a court's
analysis under Section 78-3 la-4(l). That Section provides:
78-3 la-4 Court order to arbitrate.
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
6

Obviously, Wolf Mountain has challenged Chandler and its progeny based on the stare
decisis principle that "the rule was originally erroneous." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,
399 (Utah 1994).
7

See Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, If 5, 114 P.3d 580 (mentioning Utah Code 78-3 la-4
as the basis for the defendant's motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration but not
discussing it further); Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54,ffif12-14, 17, 982 P.2d 572
(briefly discussing the right to appeal the denial of a motion to compel arbitration under
78-3 la-19(1) and mentioning 78-3 la-3 as the asserted basis for waiver and 78-3 la-4 as
the asserted basis for a motion to compel arbitration but not discussing these sections
further); Smile Inc. Asia PTELtd v. Britesmile Mgmt., Inc., 2005 UT App 381,ffif3, 13
122 P.3d 654 (mentioning § 78-3 la-3 as the asserted basis for compelling arbitration but
not discussing it further).
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arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the
scope of the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall
determine those issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-3 (emphasis added). In construing statutory provisions, this
Court "look[s] first and foremost to the statute's plain language." Peterson, 2009 UT 54
at Tf 9 (citation omitted). According to its plain terms, the Act sets forth a two-step
approach to ensure that valid private arbitration agreements are enforced by Utah courts.
First, as a matter of contract interpretation, the trial court must determine "the
existence of an arbitration agreement." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4(l). Where issues
regarding the existence or scope of an arbitration agreement are raised, the court must
"determine those issues"—in other words, interpret the arbitration agreement to establish
o

whether the parties to a dispute agreed to arbitrate the dispute. This threshold inquiry is
one of straightforward contract interpretation, since the right to "arbitration is a matter of
contract." Accordingly, ASCU correctly states that the right to arbitration originally
springs from contract. However, that does not end the inquiry under the Act.
Second, if the court finds a valid arbitration agreement, the Legislature mandates
that the court "shall order the parties to arbitrate." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4(l);
McCoy, 2001 UT at ^f 10 ("Where the evidence relating to a purported agreement to
8

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-4(l) (1999); see also, e.g., McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, ^ 11, 20 P.3d 901 ("Where the evidence is contested . . . the
court must resolve evidentiary conflicts and determine whether the movant has shown the
existence of an agreement. . . .").
9

Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT at % 10; see also Peterson, 2009 UT at t 13 ("Arbitration is a
contractual remedy for the settlement of disputes." (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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arbitrate is undisputed, the district court has no discretion under the [Act]. It must
compel arbitration."); see also Peterson, 2009 UT at ^j 11 (where a valid arbitration
agreement is found, "the court has no alternative but to enforce it."). Accordingly, as set
forth previously, after a valid arbitration agreement is found, arbitration pursuant to
section 78-3 la-4 is mandatory, jurisdictional, and cannot be waived. (WM Br. at 37-47).
For example, while evaluating an arbitration agreement under the successor Utah
Uniform Arbitration Act, this Court recently held that "[w]hen parties to a dispute have
contracted to settle their dispute in arbitration, the role of the courts is extremely limited."
Peterson, 2009 UT at ^ 8. If the parties to a dispute have agreed to settle their dispute in
arbitration, "the court has no alternative but to enforce" the agreed-upon method. Id. at f
11. In so determining, "a court must first evaluate the contract to determine whether the
parties have agreed to a[n] [arbitration] . . . method." Id, "As with any contract, we
determine what the parties have agreed upon by looking first to the plain language within
the four corners of the document." Id. at ^f 13. After examining the contract, this Court
concluded that "the plain language of the contract clearly indicates that the parties agreed
. . . that they would arbitrate their dispute." Id. at % 14. Thus, this Court held that
"arbitration must be conducted according to the [Act]." Id. at ^[15.
It is undisputed that Section 5.8.1 of the SPA Agreement requires arbitration of
certain disputes that arise thereunder. (R. 3343-51.) Tellingly, ASCU contests neither
the existence nor the scope of that arbitration clause. In fact, despite arguing that
arbitration is purely a matter of contract, ASCU utterly fails to discuss Section 5.8.1 or
any other portion of the SPA Agreement. ASCU fails to even attempt to reconcile its
20

proposed purely contractual approach with the provisions of the Act, or even to discuss
the central text of the Act at issue in this appeal Section 78-3 la-4.1
Since ASCU fails to contest either the existence or the scope of the foregoing
arbitration provision, the plain terms of the Act require this court to "order the parties to
arbitrate" without further inquiry or discretion. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4(l).
F.

ASCU's Cases Fail to Show Constitutional Analysis of the Mandatory
Nature of the Act

ASCU contends that other jurisdictions have rejected "jurisdictional claims similar
to Wolfs." (ASCU Br. at 47). However, in one of the cases ASCU cites, Morales
Rivera v. Sea Land of Puerto Rico, Inc., 418 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1969), the court did not
mention any state arbitration statute at all. Instead, the court rejected the argument that
an arbitration agreement alone deprived the court of jurisdiction. See id. at 726. This is
plainly not a "jurisdictional claim similar to Wolf Mountain's. (ASCU Br. at 47).
In another case ASCU cites, Hanslin Builders, Inc. v. Britt Dev. Corp., 44 N.E.2d
188 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), the court cited Morales Rivera for the above inapt
conclusion, then held that arbitration should not be ordered because "arbitration was
never expressly demanded." Id. at 190. Hanslin is far afield of this case.
ASCU provides a string cite of eleven cases in other states that have adopted the
Uniform Arbitration Act, yet held that a party can waive arbitration. (ASCU Br. at 45).
10

See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, ^ 32, 44 P.3d 663 ("In Utah, arbitration
is governed by the [Act] . . . ."); Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998) ("the
Utah Arbitration Act. . . works to reverse entrenched common-law skepticism of
arbitration agreements
"); see also State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995)
("[A]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous
is to be avoided." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21

However, four of those cases do not even discuss an arbitration statute. Only one of
those cases discusses whether the statute was even jurisdictional. ASCU does not even
show that such states have similar constitutional or Supreme Court law to Utah's.
ASCU's string cite provides little real support.
ASCU quotes Colorado courts in particular. (ASCU Br. at 44-45). However,
even without discussing the constitutional or statutory bases regarding this issue directly,
Colorado courts have determined that valid, enforceable arbitration agreements divest the
court of jurisdiction. For example, the Supreme Court of Colorado held:
[C]ourts may utilize the provisions of the Act to compel a party to honor an
agreement to arbitrate. To facilitate the compulsion, the Act deprives the
court of jurisdiction to proceed to trial where arbitration is required
by agreement of the parties. A valid, enforceable arbitration provision
divests trial courts of jurisdiction over all questions that are to be
submitted to arbitration, pending the conclusion of arbitration.
Hughley v. Rocky Mountain Health Maint Org., Inc., 927 P.2d 1325, 1330 (Colo. 1996)
(emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). This holding was recently reaffirmed by the
Colorado Supreme Court. See Lane v. Urgitus, 145 P.3d 672, 679 (Colo. 2006) ("Under
Colorado's arbitration act, a valid, enforceable arbitration provision divests trial courts
of jurisdiction over all questions that are to be submitted to arbitration, pending the
conclusion of arbitration." (emphasis added)).
In addition, many other states have similarly held that courts have no jurisdiction
or otherwise cannot decide the merits of cases subject to valid arbitration agreements.
11

See, e.g., Burkhartv. Semitool, Inc., 5 P.3d 1031, 1034 (Mont. 2000) ("[A] district
court may not decide the merits of a case when a valid agreement requires the parties to a
dispute to submit to arbitration."); Modern Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Puglisi, 597 So.2d
930, 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Institution of arbitration proceedings pursuant to
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ASCU quotes a Vermont case in detail on this subject. (ASCU Br. at 45-47)
(citing Lamell Lumber Corp. v. Newstress Int'l Inc., 938 A.2d 1215 (Vt. 2007)).
However, Lamell Lumber likewise did not consider any of the constitutional provisions
or arguments herein, just as the other cases ASCU cites. ASCU plainly does not show
similar constitutional provisions. As set forth above, many states disagree with the
Lamell Lumber court's conclusion that statutes requiring arbitration are not jurisdictional.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has addressed this issue. In Dean
Witter Reynolds, the Court held that, "[b]y its terms, the [Federal Arbitration] Act leaves
no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that
district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an
arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 218 (1985) (first emphasis added, second emphasis in original); see also McMahan
Sec. v. Forum Capital Mkts. L.P., 35 F.3d 82, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Under the [FAA] a
district court must stay proceedings if satisfied that the parties have agreed in writing to
statute divests circuit court of jurisdiction to make any determination on issue of
abandonment of arbitration, or any factual issue other than the making of the agreement
or provision.); Block v. Block, 693 A.2d 364, 374 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (u[T]he
[Maryland Uniform Arbitration] Act strictly confines the function of the court in suit to
compel arbitration to the resolution of a single issue—is there an agreement to arbitrate
the subject matter of a particular dispute." (internal quotation marks omitted)); IP
Timberlands Operating Co., Ltd. v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So.2d 96, 108 (Miss. 1998)
("The court's sole function is to determine whether the claim is referable to arbitration.
Once that determination is made, the court may not delve further into the dispute.");
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salecker, 622 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (If
contract provides for arbitration as sole means of resolving disputes, court's power is
ordinarily limited to enforcing agreement and directing that parties proceed to
arbitration.); Sims v. Ritter Constr., Inc., 302 S.E.2d 293, 295 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)
(Superior court had no jurisdiction to hear action arising out of contract and erred in
withdrawing matter form arbitration and placing it on trial calendar.).
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arbitrate an issue or issues underlying the district court proceeding. The FAA leaves no
discretion with the district court in the matter."). Interpreting the same provision again
two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
The Act also provides that a court must stay proceedings if it is satisfied
that an issue before it is arbitrable under [an] agreement . . . .
[Accordingly,] [t]he Arbitration Act thus establishes a federal policy
favoring arbitration requiring that we rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate. [Further,] [t]he Arbitration Act, standing alone, therefore
mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate . . . .
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (emphasis added);
see also Merit Ins. Co. v. Leather by Ins. Co., 581 F.2d 137, 142 (7th Cir. 1978) ("If the
agreement to arbitrate is valid the court has no further power or discretion to address the
issues raised in the complaint but must order arbitration . . ..").
Likewise, in Dutton, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
[A litigant's invocation of rights conferred by the FAA] led to a statutorily
mandated suspension of judicial authority. The purpose of the [Federal]
Arbitration Act is to compel a party to honor an agreement to arbitrate. To
facilitate that compulsion, the Act deprives a court from proceeding to
trial when it finds arbitration is required by agreement of the parties.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Button, 844 F.2d 726, 728 (10th Cir. 1988)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). In sum, ASCU's attempts to paint Wolf
Mountain's position as unsupported in the case law fail.
G.

The Primary Purpose of Arbitration Statutes is to Ensure Judicial
Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate, Not Expediency.

Lastly, ASCU contends that compelling arbitration in this case would undermine
the policies of expedience and conservation of resources—the purposes for arbitration
articulated by the trial court. While Wolf Mountain disputes this conclusion, the U.S.
24

Supreme Court has nevertheless specifically rejected the primacy of this argument:
We . . . reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act
was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims. . . .
The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce
private agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern
requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the
result is "piecemeal" litigation . . . .
Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 219-221 (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in the Brief of Appellant, this Court should
reverse the trial court's decision denying Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration
and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2010.
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ADDENDUM 1

Westlaw
UTST§78-31a-3
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-31a-3
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. Particular Proceedings
CHAPTER 31a. ARBITRATION ACT
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
78-31a-3

Arbitration agreement.

A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity to
set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-3, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 225, § 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Cross-References. --Industrial commission to promote voluntary arbitration of labor
disputes, § 35-1-16.
Partnership, single partner may not submit to arbitration, § 48-1-6.
Policy that work terms and conditions should result from voluntary agreement, §
34-20-1.
Public transit district labor disputes, § 17A-2-1032.
Water disputes, informal arbitration by state engineer, § 73-2-16.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Municipal corporations.
Oral modification.
Prerequisites.
Unconscionability.
Procedural.
Substantive.
Waiver.
Cited.
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